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Using Bayesian likelihood methods, this paper estimates
a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with Taylor
contracts and ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors in the goods market on
euro-area data. The paper shows how the introduction of ﬁrm-
speciﬁc factors improves the empirical ﬁt of the model and
reduces the estimated contract length to a duration of four
quarters, which is more consistent with the empirical evidence
on average price durations in the euro area. However, in order
to obtain this result, the estimated real rigidity is very large,
either in the form of a very large constant elasticity of substitu-
tion between goods or in the form of an endogenous elasticity of
substitution that is very sensitive to the relative price. Finally,
the paper also investigates the implications of these estimates
for the distribution of prices and quantities across the various
goods sectors.
JEL Codes: E1–E3.
1. Introduction
Following the theoretical work of Yun (1996) and Woodford (2003),
the New Keynesian Phillips curve, relating inﬂation to expected
future inﬂation and the marginal cost, has become a popular tool
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for monetary policy analysis. Typically, the elasticity of inﬂation
with respect to changes in the marginal cost is, however, esti-
mated to be very small (e.g., Gal´ı and Gertler 1999; Gal´ı, Gertler,
and Lo´pez-Salido 2001; and Sbordone 2002). In models with
constant-returns-to-scale technology, perfectly mobile production
factors, and a constant elasticity of substitution between goods,
such low estimates imply an implausibly high degree of nomi-
nal price stickiness. For example, Smets and Wouters (2003) ﬁnd
that, on average, nominal prices remain ﬁxed for more than two
years. This is not in line with existing microevidence that sug-
gests that, on average, prices are sticky for around six months to
one year.1
In response to these ﬁndings, a number of papers have inves-
tigated whether the introduction of additional real rigidities, such
as frictions in the mobility of capital across ﬁrms, can address this
apparent mismatch between the macro- and microestimates of the
degree of nominal price stickiness. For example, Woodford (2005),
Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004), and Altig et al. (2005) show how the
introduction of ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital lowers the elasticity of prices
with respect to the real marginal cost for a given degree of price
stickiness. This paper focuses on the same issue. Using Bayesian
likelihood methods as in Smets and Wouters (2003, 2005), it esti-
mates a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with
overlapping price and wage contracts as in Taylor (1980) and ﬁrm-
speciﬁc factors in the monopolistically competitive goods market.
With the exception of those two features, the speciﬁcation of the
DSGE model is the same as in Smets and Wouters (2005). As in
1See the evidence in Bils and Klenow (2004) for the United States and
Altissimo, Ehrmann, and Smets (2005) for a summary of the Inﬂation Persistence
Network (IPN) evidence on price stickiness in the euro area.
However, one should be careful with using the microevidence to interpret the
macroestimates. Because of indexation and a positive steady-state inﬂation rate,
all prices change all the time. However, only a small fraction of prices are set opti-
mally. The alternative story for introducing a lagged inﬂation term in the Phillips
curve based on the presence of rule-of-thumb price setters is more appealing from
this perspective, as it does not imply that all prices change all the time. In that
case, the comparison of the Calvo parameter with the microevidence makes more
sense. As the reduced-form representations are almost identical, one could still
argue that the estimated Calvo parameter is implausibly high.
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Smets and Wouters (2005), the model is estimated on quarterly
euro-area data from 1974:Q1 to 2002:Q2.2 The reason for using
Taylor contracts is twofold. First, while the simple Calvo model is
analytically tractable, its derivation with ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors and
endogenous capital accumulation is nontrivial and cannot be solved
in closed form. This complicates the empirical estimation of the full
model. The assumption of Taylor contracts facilitates the estimation
of a fully speciﬁed linearized DSGE model that embeds the pric-
ing decisions of monopolistically competitive price and wage setters
and real rigidities such as ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital and/or labor. Sec-
ond, the use of Taylor contracts in this DSGE setting makes it
easier to analyze the distribution of prices and quantities across
the various sectors. This analysis is important to check whether
the introduction of real rigidities leads to a realistic distribution
of prices and quantities (as in Altig et al. 2005). Our paper is
most closely related to that of Coenen and Levin (2004), which also
investigates the relative importance of real and nominal rigidities
in a world with Taylor contracts. However, the Coenen and Levin
(2004) paper focuses on Germany and does not specify the full struc-
tural model. Finally, in contrast to most of the papers mentioned
above, our paper also analyzes the implications of ﬁrm-speciﬁc labor
markets.
In the rest of this paper, we proceed in several steps. First, we
estimate the Taylor contracting speciﬁcation of the Smets-Wouters
DSGE model under the assumption that ﬁrms are price takers in
the factor markets, i.e., the labor and capital markets, and hence all
ﬁrms face the same ﬂat marginal cost curve. We compare this speci-
ﬁcation with the analogous Calvo model and ﬁnd that the length of
the Taylor contracts in the goods market needs to be extremely long
(about ﬁve years) in order to match the data as well as the Calvo
scheme. Though striking, this result is consistent with Dixon and
Kara (2006), who show how to compare the mean duration of con-
tracts in both time-dependent price-setting models. In this section,
we also show that the standard way of introducing markup shocks
in the Calvo model does not work very well with Taylor-type price
2As shown in Smets and Wouters (2005), estimation results are quite similar
for U.S. data.
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setting, and we propose a diﬀerent way of introducing price-markup
shocks.
Next, we reestimate the Taylor contracting models with ﬁrm-
speciﬁc capital and/or ﬁrm-speciﬁc labor and analyze the impact
of these assumptions on the empirical performance of the DSGE
model and on the estimated contract length in the goods market.
Our main ﬁndings are twofold. First, in line with the previous lit-
erature, we ﬁnd that introducing ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital does lead to
a fall in the estimated Taylor contract length in the goods market
to a more reasonable length of four quarters. However, the elasticity
of substitution between goods of the various price-setting cohorts
is estimated to be improbably high. Furthermore, the corresponding
price markup is estimated to be smaller than the ﬁxed cost, implying
negative proﬁts in steady state. Enforcing a steady-state zero-proﬁt
condition leads to a signiﬁcant deterioration of the empirical ﬁt. At
the same time, the estimated elasticity of substitution remains very
large. Moving from the traditional Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator toward
Kimball’s (1995) generalized aggregator helps to solve both prob-
lems. In that case, the curvature parameter is estimated to be high,
which is a sign that real rigidities are at work, but both the esti-
mated elasticity of substitution and the cost of imposing the above-
mentioned zero-proﬁt constraint are sharply reduced. These results
are in line with Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004), Coenen and Levin
(2004), and Altig et al. (2005). In this context, we also investigate the
implications of the various models for the ﬁrm-speciﬁc supply and
pricing decisions, which are straightforward to perform in a Taylor
contracting framework.
Finally, we also analyze the impact on empirical performance
of introducing ﬁrm-speciﬁc labor markets. Here the results are less
promising in terms of reducing the estimated degree of nominal
price stickiness. The reason is that ﬁrm-speciﬁc labor markets only
dampen the price impact of a change in demand for a given degree of
nominal price stickiness if the ﬁrm-speciﬁc labor markets are ﬂexible
and the ﬁrm-speciﬁc wage is responding strongly to changes in the
demand for labor. Such wage ﬂexibility is, however, incompatible
with the empirical properties of aggregate wage behavior.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. First, section 2
reviews the estimated DSGE model of Smets and Wouters (2005)
and introduces Taylor-type contracting in goods and labor markets.
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Next, section 3 explores the impact of introducing ﬁrm-speciﬁc pro-
duction factors. The concluding remarks are in section 4.
2. Taylor and Calvo Price Setting
with Mobile Production Factors
In this section, we compare the empirical performance of the Taylor
price-setting model with the Calvo model estimated in Smets and
Wouters (2005), maintaining the assumption of mobile production
factors across ﬁrms. We ﬁrst brieﬂy review the Calvo model of Smets
and Wouters (2005) and the alternative Taylor speciﬁcation. Then,
we compare the estimates of both models on euro-area data.
2.1 The Smets-Wouters Model with Calvo
and Taylor Price Setting
The Smets-Wouters (2005) model contains many frictions that aﬀect
both nominal and real decisions of households and ﬁrms. Households
maximize a nonseparable utility function with two arguments (goods
and labor eﬀort) over an inﬁnite life horizon. Consumption appears
in the utility function relative to a time-varying external habit vari-
able. Labor is diﬀerentiated, so that there is some monopoly power
over wages, which results in an explicit wage equation and allows for
the introduction of sticky nominal wages a` la Calvo (1983). House-
holds rent capital services to ﬁrms and decide how much capital to
accumulate, taking into account capital adjustment costs.
The main focus in this paper is on the ﬁrms’ price setting. In
the Calvo speciﬁcation, a continuum of ﬁrms produces diﬀerentiated
goods, decides on labor and capital inputs, and sets prices. Follow-
ing Calvo (1983), every period, only a fraction (1 − ξp) of ﬁrms in
the monopolistic competitive sector are allowed to reoptimize their
price. This fraction is constant over time. Moreover, those ﬁrms that
are not allowed to reoptimize index their prices to the past inﬂation
rate and the time-varying inﬂation target of the central bank. An
additional important assumption is that all ﬁrms are price takers
in the factor markets for labor and capital and thus face the same
marginal cost. The marginal costs depend on wages, the rental rate
of capital, and productivity.
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As shown in Smets and Wouters (2005), this leads to the follow-
ing linearized inﬂation equation:
πˆt − π¯t = β1 + βγp (Etπˆt+1 − π¯t) +
γp
1 + βγp
(πˆt−1 − π¯t)
+
1
1 + βγp
(1 − βξp)(1 − ξp)
ξp
sˆt + η
p
t (1)
sˆt = αrˆkt + (1 − α)wˆt − εat − (1 − α)γt. (2)
Parameters α and β are, respectively, the capital share and the
household’s discount factor. The deviation of inﬂation πˆt from the
target inﬂation rate π¯t depends on past and expected future inﬂation
deviations and on the current marginal cost (which itself is a function
of the rental rate on capital rˆkt , the real wage wˆt, and the produc-
tivity process) that is composed of a deterministic trend in labor
eﬃciency γt and a stochastic component εat , which is assumed to fol-
low a ﬁrst-order autoregressive process: εat = ρaε
a
t−1 + η
a
t , where η
a
t
is an i.i.d.-normal productivity shock. Finally, ηpt is an i.i.d.-normal
price-markup shock. When the degree of indexation to past inﬂa-
tion is zero (γp = 0), this equation reverts to the standard purely
forward-looking New Keynesian Phillips curve. When all prices are
ﬂexible (ξp = 0) and the price-markup shock is zero, this equation
reduces to the normal condition that, in a ﬂexible-price economy,
the real marginal cost is constant.
In the Taylor speciﬁcation, ﬁrms set prices for a ﬁxed number of
periods, and price setting is staggered over the duration of the con-
tract, i.e., the number of ﬁrms adjusting their price is the same every
period.3 The explicit modeling of the diﬀerent cohorts in the Taylor
model facilitates the introduction of ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital and labor
in the next section, as no aggregation across cohorts is required. It
also has the advantage that the cohort-speciﬁc output and price lev-
els are directly available, which is important for checking whether
3See Coenen and Levin (2004) and Dixon and Kara (2005) for a generalization
of the standard Taylor contracting model where diﬀerent ﬁrms may set prices for
diﬀerent lengths of time. See also chapter 2 in Taylor (1993).
Vol. 2 No. 3 Firm-Speciﬁc Production Factors in a DSGE Model 113
the dispersion of output and prices across price-setting cohorts is
realistic.
In order to be able to compare the Taylor price-setting model
with the Calvo model estimated in Smets and Wouters (2005), we
maintain the assumption of partial indexation to lagged inﬂation and
the inﬂation objective. As discussed in Whelan (2004) and Coenen
and Levin (2004), the staggered Taylor contracting model gives rise
to the following linearized equations for the newly set optimal price
and the general price index:
pˆ∗t =
1∑np−1
i=0 β
i
⎡⎣ np−1∑
i=0
βi(sˆt+i + pˆt+i)
−
np−2∑
i=0
⎛⎝(γpπˆt+i + (1 − γp)π¯t+i+1) np−1∑
q=i+1
βq
⎞⎠⎤⎦+ dεpt (3)
pˆt =
1
np
np−1∑
i=0
(
pˆ∗t−i +
i−1∑
q=0
(γpπˆt−1−q + (1 − γp)π¯t−q)
)
+ (1 − d)εpt ,
(4)
where np is the duration of the contract, d is a binary para-
meter (d ∈ {0, 1}), and εpt = ρpt εpt−1 + ηpt , with ηpt an i.i.d.
shock. We experiment with two ways of introducing the price-
markup shocks in the Taylor contracting model. The ﬁrst method
(d = 1) is fully analogous with the Calvo model. We assume a
time-varying markup in the optimal price-setting equation, which
introduces a shock in the linearized price-setting equation (3) as
shown above. The second method (d = 0) is somewhat more
ad hoc. It consists of introducing a shock in the aggregate price
equation (4).4
4This could be justiﬁed as a relative price shock to a ﬂexible-price sector that is
not explicitly modeled. Of course, such a shortcut ignores the general equilibrium
implications (e.g., in terms of labor and capital reallocations).
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Similarly, we introduce Taylor contracting in the wage-setting
process. This leads to the following linearized equations for the newly
set optimal wage and the average wage:
wˆ∗t =
1∑nw−1
i=0 β
i
⎡⎣ nw−1∑
i=0
βi
(
σl lˆi,t+i +
1
1 − h(cˆt+i − hcˆt+i−1) − ε
l
t+i
)
+
nw−1∑
i=1
⎛⎝(πˆt+i − γwπˆt+i−1 − (1 − γw)π¯t+i) nw−1∑
q=i
βq
⎞⎠⎤⎦+ dεwt
(5)
wˆt =
1
nw
[
nw−1∑
i=0
wˆi,t + pˆt−i
]
− pˆt + (1 − d)εwt (6)
with
wˆi,t = wˆ∗t−i +
i−1∑
q=0
(γwπˆt−1−q + (1 − γw)π¯t−q) (7)
lˆi,t+i = lˆt+i − 1 + λw
λw
[wˆi,t+i + pˆt − (wˆt+i + pˆt+i)], (8)
where nw is the duration of the wage contract; σl represents
the inverse elasticity of work eﬀort with respect to real wage; lˆt
is the labor demand described in equation (23) (cf. appendix 2); lˆi,t
is the demand for the labor supplied at nominal wage wˆi,t by the
households who reoptimized their wage i periods ago; h is the habit
parameter; cˆt is consumption; εlt = ρ
l
tε
l
t−1+η
l
t, with η
l
t an i.i.d. shock
to the labor supply; γw is the degree of indexation to the lagged wage
growth rate; and εwt = ρ
w
t ε
w
t−1 + η
w
t , with η
w
t an i.i.d. wage-markup
shock. Finally, λw is the wage markup. Note that, as we did for price
shocks, wage shocks have been introduced in two diﬀerent ways.
The rest of the linearized DSGE model is summarized in
appendix 2. In sum, irrespective of the pricing speciﬁcation, the
Smets-Wouters (2005) model determines nine endogenous variables:
inﬂation, the real wage, capital, the value of capital, investment,
consumption, the short-term nominal interest rate, the rental rate
on capital, and hours worked. The stochastic behavior is dri-
ven by ten exogenous shocks. Five shocks arise from technology
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and preference parameters: the total factor productivity shock,
the investment-speciﬁc technology shock, the preference shock, the
labor-supply shock, and the government-spending shock. Those
shocks are assumed to follow an autoregressive process of order one.
Three shocks can be interpreted as “cost-push” shocks: the price-
markup shock, the wage-markup shock, and the equity-premium
shock. Those are assumed to follow a white-noise process. And,
ﬁnally, there are two monetary policy shocks: a permanent inﬂation
target shock and a temporary interest rate shock.
Before discussing the estimation results, it is worth highlighting
two issues. First, Dixon and Kara (2006) have argued that a proper
comparison of the degree of price stickiness in the Taylor and Calvo
model should be based on the average age of the running contracts,
rather than on the average frequency of price changes. As is well
known, in a Calvo pricing model the average age of the running
contracts is computed as
(1 − ξp)
∞∑
i=0
ξip · (i+ 1) =
1
1 − ξp ,
while the corresponding statistic for Taylor contracts is given by
1
np
np∑
i=1
i =
np + 1
2
.
Thus, in order to produce the same average contract age as the
one implied by a Calvo parameter ξp, the Taylor-contract length
needs to be 1+ξp1−ξp periods. The Calvo parameter ξp = 0.9 estimated
in section 2 above therefore implies a long Taylor-contract length of
nineteen quarters.
Figure 1 conﬁrms the Dixon and Kara (2006) analysis by com-
paring the impulse responses to, respectively, a productivity and a
monetary policy shock in the baseline Calvo model and four-, ten-,
and twenty-quarter Taylor contracting, keeping the other parameters
ﬁxed at those estimated for the baseline Calvo model. In this ﬁgure
the wage contract length nw is ﬁxed at four quarters. As the dura-
tion of the Taylor contract lengthens, the impulse responses appear
to approach the outcome under the Calvo model. One needs a very
long duration (about twenty quarters) in order to come close to the
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Figure 1. Selected Impulse Responses: Calvo versus
Taylor Contracts (Baseline Parameters)
Legend: Bold black line: baseline (Calvo) model; full line: 20-quarter Tay-
lor price contract; dashed line: 10-quarter Taylor price contract; dotted line:
4-quarter Taylor price contract.
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Calvo model. With shorter Taylor contracts, typically the inﬂation
response becomes larger in size but also less persistent. Conversely,
the output and real wage responses are closer to the ﬂexible-price
outcome. For example, in response to a monetary policy shock, the
response of output is considerably smaller. Moreover, with shorter
Taylor contracts, the inﬂation response changes sign quite abruptly
after the length of the contract. This feature is absent in the Calvo
speciﬁcation. As discussed in Whelan (2004), in reduced-form inﬂa-
tion equations, the reversal of the inﬂation response after the con-
tract length is captured by a negative coeﬃcient on lagged inﬂation
once current and expected future marginal costs are taken into
account.
A second issue relates to the way in which the price shocks are
introduced. As shown in ﬁgure 2, the two ways of introducing price
(resp. wage) shocks discussed above generate very diﬀerent short-
run dynamics in response to such shocks. The right-hand panels of
ﬁgure 2 shows that introducing a persistent shock in the GDP deﬂa-
tor equation (i.e., d = 0) allows the Taylor contracting model to
mimic most closely the response to a markup shock in the baseline
Calvo speciﬁcation.5
2.2 Estimation Results
We now turn to the main estimation results. The full set of results
as well as a description of the euro-area data set and the assumed
prior distributions can be found in the appendices. A number of
results are worth highlighting. First, we conﬁrm the ﬁndings of
Smets and Wouters (2005) regarding the Calvo speciﬁcation. The
degree of indexation is rather limited, while the degree of Calvo price
stickiness is very large: each period, 89 percent of the ﬁrms do not
reoptimize their price setting. The average age of the price contract
is therefore more than two years (9.1 quarters). Second, as illus-
trated by ﬁgure 3, which plots the log data density of the estimated
Taylor model as a function of the contract length, the contract length
that maximizes the predictive performance of the Taylor model is
nineteen quarters. This again conﬁrms the analysis of Dixon and
5The same exercise could actually be run for a wage shock. Since it leads to
similar conclusions, we do not reproduce it here.
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Figure 2. Impulse Response to a Price Shock in the
20-Quarter Taylor Model for Diﬀerent Speciﬁcations
of the Price Shock (Baseline Parameters)
d = 1: Price Shock in (3) d = 0: Price Shock in (4)
Legend: Bold black line: baseline (Calvo) model; black line: 20-quarter
Taylor contract with persistent price shock; dashed line: 20-quarter Taylor
contract with i.i.d. price shock.
Kara (2006) discussed above. A Calvo parameter of 0.9 implies an
average length of the contracts of about nineteen quarters. Third, we
conﬁrm (results not shown) that, in line with the impulse responses
shown in ﬁgure 2, the speciﬁcation with the persistent price shock
in the GDP price equation (d = 0) does best in terms of empirical
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Figure 3. Log Data Density for Taylor Contracting
Models with Diﬀerent Lengths
Legend: The black line represents the log data density in the baseline
Calvo model; black diamonds denote the Taylor model with mobile pro-
duction factors and a persistent price shock in the GDP price; white dia-
monds denote the same model but with nonmobile capital, zero proﬁts, and
endogenous markup (see section 4.4).
performance. For example, the log data density of the estimated
model with ten-quarter Taylor contracts improves by ninety points
relative to the speciﬁcation with a persistent price shock in the opti-
mal price-setting equation. Similar improvements are found for other
contract lengths. Moreover, the empirical performance also improves
signiﬁcantly by allowing for persistence in the price shocks.6
Table 1 compares some of the estimated parameters across var-
ious Taylor models and the Calvo model. While most of the other
parameters are estimated to be very similar, it is noteworthy that
the estimated degree of indexation rises quite signiﬁcantly as the
assumed Taylor contracts become shorter. Possibly, this reﬂects
the need to overcome the negative dependence on past inﬂation in
the standard Taylor contract. Next we turn to the introduction of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors in the Taylor model.
6Similar ﬁndings have been found for various speciﬁcations of the wage shock.
For that reason, we consider a persistent wage shock in the average wage equation
for all the estimations performed in the rest of the paper.
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Table 1. Comparing the Calvo Model with Taylor
Contracting Models
Calvo 4-Q Tayl. 8-Q Tayl. 10-Q Tayl. 19-Q Tayl.
Log Data Densities
−471.113 −495.566 −489.174 −485.483 −468.469
Selection of Estimated Parameter Outcomes
ρa 0.991 0.980 0.982 0.962 0.983
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
σa 0.653 0.615 0.682 0.619 0.622
(0.093) (0.068) (0.085) (0.076) (0.085)
ρp 0 0.995 0.995 0.912 0.934
(–) (0.004) (0.004) (0.016) (0.018)
σp 0.207 0.406 0.323 0.277 0.229
(0.019) (0.030) (0.023) (0.020) (0.016)
ρw 0 0.973 0.966 0.881 0.955
(–) (0.012) (0.014) (0.017) (0.012)
σw 0.250 0.4386 0.453 0.461 0.454
(0.021) (0.031) (0.034) (0.031) (0.035)
γw 0.388 0.313 0.397 0.351 0.460
(0.197) (0.166) (0.205) (0.206) (0.188)
γp 0.178 0.859 0.463 0.436 0.273
(0.096) (0.150) (0.130) (0.116) (0.074)
A 9.1 Q 2.5 Q 4.5 Q 5.5 Q 10 Q
Note: ρa, ρp, and ρw are the persistence parameters associated with the
productivity, the price, and the wage shock, respectively; σa, σp, and σw
are the standard error of the productivity, the price, and the wage shock,
respectively; γw and γp are, respectively, the wage and price indexation
parameters; A is the average age of the price contract.
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3. Firm-Speciﬁc Production Factors
and Taylor Contracts
3.1 Modeling Firm-Speciﬁc Factors
So far the model includes all kinds of adjustment costs such as those
related to the accumulation of new capital, to changes in prices and
wages, and to changes in capacity utilization, but shifting capital
or labor from one ﬁrm to another is assumed to be costless (see
Danthine and Donaldson 2002). The latter assumption is clearly
not fully realistic. In this section we instead assume that produc-
tion factors are ﬁrm speciﬁc, i.e., the cost of moving them across
ﬁrms is extremely high. Although this is also an extreme assump-
tion, it may be more realistic. The objective is to investigate the
implications of introducing this additional real rigidity on the esti-
mated degree of nominal price stickiness and the overall empirical
performance of the Taylor contracting model. As shown in Coenen
and Levin (2004) for the Taylor model and Woodford (2003, 2005),
Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004), and Altig et al. (2005) for the
Calvo model, the introduction of ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital reduces the
sensitivity of inﬂation with respect to its driving variables. Sim-
ilarly, Woodford (2003, 2005) shows that ﬁrm-speciﬁc labor may
also help reduce price variations and may lead to higher inﬂation
persistence.
In the case of ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors, the key equations of the lin-
earized model governing the decision of a ﬁrm belonging to the
cohort j (with j ∈ [1, np]), which reoptimizes its price in period
t, are given by
pˆ∗t (j) =
1∑np−1
i=0 β
i
⎡⎣ np−1∑
i=0
βi(sˆt+i(j) + pˆt+i)
−
np−2∑
i=0
⎛⎝(γpπˆt+i + (1 − γp)π¯t+i+1) np−1∑
q=i+1
βq
⎞⎠⎤⎦ (3b)
pˆt =
1
np
np−1∑
i=0
pˆt(j − i) + εpt (4b)
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sˆt+i(j) = αρˆt+i(j) + (1 − α)wˆt+i(j) − εˆat+i − (1 − α)γt (9)
Yˆt+i(j) = Yˆt+i − 1 + λp
λp
(pˆt+i(j) − pˆt+i) (10)
pˆt+i(j) = pˆ∗t (j) +
i−1∑
q=0
(γpπˆt−1−q + (1 − γp)π¯t−q) (11)
with
∂ρˆt+i(j)
∂Yˆt+i(j)
> 0 and
∂wˆt+i(j)
∂Yˆt+i(j)
> 0, (12)
where ρˆt(j) is the “shadow rental rate of capital services,”7 and λp
is the price markup so that 1+λpλp is the elasticity of substitution
between goods. The main diﬀerence with equations (3) and (4) is
that the introduction of ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors implies that ﬁrms no
longer share the same marginal cost. Instead, a ﬁrm’s marginal cost
and its optimal price will depend on the demand for its output.
A higher demand for its output implies that the ﬁrm will have a
higher demand for the ﬁrm-speciﬁc input factors, which in turn will
lead to a rise in the ﬁrm-speciﬁc wage costs and capital rental rate.
Because this demand will be aﬀected by the pricing behavior of the
ﬁrm’s competitors, the optimal price will also depend on the pricing
decisions of the competitors.
The net eﬀect of this interaction will be to dampen the price
eﬀects of various shocks. Consider, for example, an unexpected
demand expansion. Compared to the case of homogenous marginal
costs across ﬁrms, the ﬁrst price mover will increase its price by
less because, everything else being equal, the associated fall in the
relative demand for its goods leads to a fall in its relative marginal
cost. This, in turn, reduces the incentive to raise prices. This rel-
ative marginal cost eﬀect is absent when factors are mobile across
ﬁrms and, as a result, ﬁrms face the same marginal cost irrespec-
tive of their output levels. From this example it is clear that the
7Indeed, we left aside the assumption of a rental market for capital services.
Each ﬁrm builds its own capital stock. The “shadow rental rate of capital ser-
vices”is the rental rate of capital services such that the ﬁrm would hire the same
quantity of capital services in an economy with a market for capital services as
it does in the economy with ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital.
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extent to which variations in ﬁrm-speciﬁc marginal costs will reduce
the amplitude of price variations will depend on the combination of
two elasticities: (i) the elasticity of substitution between the goods
produced by the ﬁrm and those produced by its competitors, which
will govern how sensitive relative demand for a ﬁrm’s goods is to
changes in its relative price (see equation [4b]); (ii) the elasticity of
the individual ﬁrm’s marginal cost with respect to changes in the
demand for its products (see equation [4b]). With a Cobb-Douglas
production function, the latter elasticity will mainly depend on the
elasticity of the supply of the factors with respect to changes in
the factor prices. In brief, the combination of a steep ﬁrm-speciﬁc
marginal cost curve and high demand elasticity will maximize the
relative marginal cost eﬀect and minimize the price eﬀects, thereby
reducing the need for a high estimated degree of nominal price
stickiness.
Before turning to a quantitative analysis of these eﬀects in
the next sections, it is worth examining in somewhat more detail the
determinants of the partial derivatives in equation (12) in each of the
two factor markets (capital and labor). Consider ﬁrst ﬁrm-speciﬁc
capital. Given the one-period time-to-build assumption in capital
accumulation, the ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital stock is given within the quar-
ter. As a result, when the demand faced by the ﬁrm increases, pro-
duction can only be adjusted by either increasing the labor/capital
ratio or by increasing the rate of capital utilization. Both actions
will tend to increase the cost of capital services. It is, however, also
clear that when the ﬁrm can increase the utilization of capital at
a constant marginal cost, the eﬀect of an increase in demand on
the cost of capital will be zero. In this case, the supply of capital
services is inﬁnitely elastic at a rental price that equals the mar-
ginal cost of changing capital utilization and, as a result, the ﬁrst
elasticity in equation (12) will be zero. In the estimations reported
below, the marginal cost of changing capital utilization is indeed
high, so that in eﬀect there is nearly no possibility to change capital
utilization. Over time, the ﬁrm can adjust its capital stock sub-
ject to adjustment costs. This implies that the ﬁrm’s marginal cost
depends on its capital stock, which itself depends on previous pricing
and investment decisions of the ﬁrm. As a result, the capital stock,
the value of capital, and investment will also be ﬁrm speciﬁc. In the
case of a Calvo model, Woodford (2005) and Christiano (2004) show
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how the linearized model can still be solved in terms of aggregate
variables, without solving for the whole distribution of the capital
stock over the diﬀerent ﬁrms. This linearization is, however, compli-
cated and remains model speciﬁc. With staggered Taylor contracts,
it is straightforward to model the cohorts of ﬁrms characterized by
the same price separately. The key linearized equations governing
the investment decision for a ﬁrm belonging to the jth cohort are
then
Kˆt(j) = (1 − τ)Kˆt−1(j) + τ Iˆt−1(j) + τεIt−1 (13)
Iˆt(j) =
1
1 + β
Iˆt−1(j) +
β
1 + β
EtIˆt+1(j) +
1/ϕ
1 + β
Qˆt(j) + εIt (14)
Qˆt(j) = −(Rˆt − πˆt+1) + 1 − τ1 − τ + ρ¯EtQˆt+1(j)
+
ρ¯
1 − τ + ρ¯Etρˆt+1(j) + η
Q
t , (15)
where Kˆt(j), Iˆt(j), and Qˆt(j) are, respectively, the capital stock,
investment, and the Tobin’s Q for each of the ﬁrms belonging to
the jth price-setting cohort. Parameter τ is the depreciation rate of
capital, and ρ¯ is the shadow rental rate of capital discussed above,
so that β = 1/(1 − τ + ρ¯). Parameter ϕ depends on the investment
adjustment-cost function.8
Consider next ﬁrm-speciﬁc monopolistic competitive labor mar-
kets. In this case each ﬁrm requires a speciﬁc type of labor that
cannot be used in other ﬁrms. Moreover, within each ﬁrm-speciﬁc
labor market, we allow for Taylor-type staggered wage setting. The
following linearized equations display how a worker belonging to the
fth wage-setting cohort (with f ∈ [1, nw]) optimizes its wage in
8As in the baseline model, there are two aggregate investment
shocks: εIt , which is an investment technology shock, and η
Q
t , which is meant
to capture stochastic variations in the external ﬁnance premium. The ﬁrst one
is assumed to follow an AR(1) process with an i.i.d.-normal error term and the
second is assumed to be i.i.d.-normal distributed.
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period t for the labor it rents to the ﬁrms of the jth price-setting
cohort (with j ∈ [1, np]):
wˆ∗t (f, j) =
1∑nw−1
i=0 β
i
×
⎡⎣ nw−1∑
i=0
βi
(
σl lˆt+i(f, j) +
1
1 − h(cˆt+i − hcˆt+i−1) − ε
l
t+i
)
+
nw−1∑
i=1
⎛⎝(πˆt+i − γwπˆt+i−1 − (1 − γw)π¯t+i) nw−1∑
q=i
βq
⎞⎠⎤⎦
(5b)
wˆt(j) =
1
nw
[
nw−1∑
i=0
wˆt(f − i, j) + pˆt−i
]
− pˆt + εwt (6b)
wˆt+i(f, j) = wˆ∗t (f, j) +
i−1∑
q=0
(γwπˆt−1−q + (1 − γw)π¯t−q) (7b)
lˆt+i(f, j) = lˆt+i(j) − 1 + λw
λw
(wˆt+i(f, j) + pˆt − (wˆt+i(j) + pˆt+i))
(8b)
lˆt(j) = −wˆt(j) + (1 + ψ)ρˆt(j) + Kˆt−1(j). (23b)
It directly appears from these equations that there is now a labor
market for each cohort of ﬁrms. Contrarily to the homogeneous labor
setting, the labor demand of (cohort of) ﬁrm(s) j (equation [23b])
directly aﬀects the optimal wage chosen by the worker f (equa-
tion [5b]) and, consequently, the cohort-speciﬁc average wage (equa-
tion [6b]). When γw = 0, real wages do not depend on the lagged
inﬂation rate.9
Due to the staggered wage setting, it is not so simple to see how
changes in the demand for the ﬁrm’s output will aﬀect the ﬁrm-
speciﬁc wage cost (equation [12]). A number of intuitive statements
can, however, be made. First, higher wage stickiness as captured
by the length of the typical wage contract will tend to reduce the
9Parameter ψ is the inverse of the elasticity of the capital-utilization cost
function.
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response of wages to demand. As a result, high wage stickiness is
likely to reduce the impact of ﬁrm-speciﬁc labor markets on the esti-
mated degree of nominal price stickiness. In contrast, with ﬂexible
wages, the relative wage eﬀect may be quite substantial, contribut-
ing to large changes in relative marginal cost of the ﬁrm and thereby
dampening the relative price eﬀects discussed above. Second, this
eﬀect is likely to be larger the higher the demand elasticity of labor
(as captured by a lower labor-market markup parameter) and the
higher the elasticity of labor supply. Concerning the latter, if labor
supply is inﬁnitely elastic, wages will again tend to be very sticky
and, as a result, relative wage costs will not respond very much to
changes in relative demand, even in the case of ﬁrm-speciﬁc labor
markets.
3.2 Alternative Models
In this section we illustrate the discussion above by displaying how
the output, the marginal cost, and the price of the ﬁrst price-
setting cohort respond to a monetary policy shock. We compare the
benchmark model with mobile production factors (hereafter denoted
MKL) with the following three models:
1. A model with homogeneous capital and ﬁrm-speciﬁc labor
market (hereafter denoted NML).
2. A model with ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital and homogeneous labor
(hereafter denoted NMK).
3. A model with ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital and labor (hereafter
denoted NMKL).
Moreover, for each of those models we consider four cases corre-
sponding to ﬂexible and sticky wages and low (0.01) and high (0.05)
markups in the goods market.10 Figure 4 shows the responses of
10This corresponds to demand elasticities of 21 and 101, respectively. The latter
is the one estimated by Altig et al. (2005). Furthermore, one needs rather high
substitution elasticities to observe signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the homoge-
neous marginal cost model and its ﬁrm-speciﬁc production-factors counterparts.
So, for demand elasticities below 10, there is nearly no diﬀerence between the
MKL model and the NML, NMK, and NMKL ones. This indicates again the
importance of a very elastic demand curve.
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Figure 4. The Eﬀect of a Monetary Policy Shock
on Output, Marginal Cost, and Price of the First
Cohort in the Three Considered Models
Legend: Bold black line: MKL; black line: NMKL; dashed line: NMK;
dotted line: NML
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the cohort that is allowed to change its price in the period of the
monetary policy shock. In this ﬁgure we assume that the length of
the price and wage contracts is four quarters. The rest of the para-
meters are those estimated for the benchmark Taylor model (MKL)
with the corresponding contract length. Responses are displayed for
the ﬁrst ten quarters following the shock, i.e., prices are reoptimized
three times by the considered cohort in the time span considered, at
periods 1, 5, and 9.
Several points are worth noting. First, introducing ﬁrm-speciﬁc
factors always reduces the initial impact on prices and output, while
it increases the impact on the marginal cost. As discussed above,
with ﬁrm-speciﬁc production factors, price-setting ﬁrms internalize
the fact that large price responses lead to large variations in mar-
ginal costs and therefore lower their initial price response. Second,
the introduction of ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors increases the persistence of
price changes, in particular, when wages are ﬂexible. While in the
case of mobile production factors with ﬂexible wages, the initial price
decrease is partially reversed after four quarters; prices continue to
decrease ﬁve and nine quarters after the initial shock when factors
are ﬁrm speciﬁc. Third, in the case with mobile factors (MKL—the
bold black curve in ﬁgure 4), it is clear that prices and marginal
cost are not aﬀected by changes in the demand elasticity, while
the ﬁrm’s output is very much aﬀected. On the contrary, for all
the models with at least one nonmobile production factor, price
responses decrease, while marginal cost variations increase with a
higher demand elasticity.
Finally, as long as wages are considered to be ﬂexible, a ﬁrm-
speciﬁc labor market is the device that leads to the largest reactions
in marginal cost. It is also worth noting that the combination of
a ﬁrm-speciﬁc labor market and ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital brings more
reaction in the marginal cost than the respective eﬀect of each
assumption separately.11 However, as soon as wages become sticky,
ﬁrm-speciﬁc labor markets do not generate much more variability in
marginal cost. In this case, it is striking that the responses of the
NMK and NMKL models get very close to each other.
11This is actually much in line with the ﬁndings of Matheron (2005) in a Calvo
price-ﬂexible wage setting with ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital and labor.
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3.3 Estimation
In this section we reestimate the model with ﬁrm-speciﬁc produc-
tion factors to investigate the eﬀects on the empirical performance
of the model. Sbordone (2002) and Gal´ı, Gertler, and Lo´pez-Salido
(2001) show that considering capital as a ﬁxed factor that cannot be
moved across ﬁrms does indeed reduce the estimated degree of nomi-
nal price stickiness in U.S. data. In particular, it reduces the implied
duration of nominal contracts from an implausibly high number of
more than two years to a duration of typically less than a year.
Altig et al. (2005) reach the same conclusion in a richer setup where
ﬁrms endogenously determine their capital stock. In this section, we
extend this analysis to the case of ﬁrm-speciﬁc labor markets and
test whether similar results are obtained in the context of Taylor
contracts.
Table 2 reports the log data densities of the three models consid-
ered above and their ﬂexible/sticky wages variants for various price-
contract lengths. A higher log data density implies a better empirical
ﬁt in terms of the model’s one-step-ahead prediction performance.
The following ﬁndings are noteworthy. First, in almost all cases,
the data prefer the sticky-wage version over the ﬂexible-wage version.
Table 2. Log Data Densities for the Three Models
Considered and Their Variants
2-Q Taylor 4-Q Taylor 6-Q Taylor 8-Q Taylor
Flexible Wages
NML –520.21 –481.86 –492.87 –490.16
NMKL –484.92 –479.56 –481.87 –485.23
NMK –486.50 –480.68 –482.16 –481.97
Sticky Wages (4-Quarter Taylor Contract)
NML –512.50 –490.19 –484.72 –480.54
NMKL –484.46 –466.10 –475.80 –477.23
NMK –479.11 –464.92 –473.17 –474.30
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This is not surprising, as sticky wages are better able to capture
the empirical persistence in wage developments. In what follows,
we therefore focus on the sticky-wage models. Second, with sticky
wages, the data prefer the model with ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital but
mobile labor. The introduction of ﬁrm-speciﬁc labor markets does
not help the empirical ﬁt of the model. The main reason for this
result is that, as argued before, in order for ﬁrm-speciﬁc labor mar-
kets to help in explaining price and inﬂation persistence, one needs
a strong response of wages to changes in demand. But this is in
contrast to the observed persistence in wage developments. On the
other hand, as we do not observe the rental rate of capital, no such
empirical constraint is relevant for the introduction of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
capital. Finally, introducing ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital does indeed reduce
the contract length that ﬁts the data best. While the log data den-
sity is maximized at a contract length of nineteen quarters in the
case of homogeneous production factors, it is maximized at only four
quarters when capital cannot move across ﬁrms. This is clearly dis-
played in ﬁgure 3 (even though it is shown for a variant model with
endogenous markup developed in section 4.4 below). As clariﬁed by
Dixon and Kara (2006), this is equivalent in terms of price duration
to a Calvo probability of not reoptimizing equal to 0.6. This con-
ﬁrms the ﬁndings of Gal´ı, Gertler, and Lo´pez-Salido (2001) and Altig
et al. (2005). Moreover, it turns out that the four-quarter Taylor
contracting model with ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital performs as well as the
nineteen-quarter Taylor contracting model with mobile capital.
In line with these results, in the rest of the paper we will focus
on the model with ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital, homogeneous labor, and
sticky wages. Table 3 presents a selection of the parameters esti-
mated for this model with various contract lengths. Note that, in
comparison to the case with homogeneous production factors, we
also estimate the elasticity of substitution between the goods of the
various cohorts. A number of ﬁndings are worth noting. First, allow-
ing for ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital leads to a drop in the estimated degree
of indexation to past inﬂation in the goods sector. In comparison
with results displayed in table 1, in this case the parameter drops
back to the low level estimated for the Calvo model and does not
appear to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Second, as discussed in
Coenen and Levin (2004), one advantage of the Taylor price setting
is that the price-markup parameter is identiﬁed and therefore can
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Table 3. A Selection of Estimated Parameters
for the Taylor Contract Models with
Firm-Speciﬁc Capital (NMK)
2-Q Taylor 4-Q Taylor 6-Q Taylor 8-Q Taylor
σp 0.216 0.225 0.232 0.230
(0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.017)
ρp 0.997 0.979 0.863 0.802
(0.002) (0.029) (0.124) (0.085)
1 + φ 1.616 1.515 1.522 1.520
(0.093) (0.138) (0.111) (0.100)
λp 0.0008 0.004 0.008 0.016
(0.0003) (0.0015) (0.003) (0.006)
γp 0.067 0.093 0.149 0.220
(0.070) (0.077) (0.094) (0.102)
γw 0.403 0.463 0.547 0.436
(0.195) (0.210) (0.232) (0.231)
Note: ρp is the persistence parameter associated to the price shock; σp
is the standard error of the price shock; γw and γp are, respectively, the
wage and price indexation parameters; φ is the share of the ﬁxed cost;
λp is the price markup.
be estimated. In contrast, with Calvo price setting, the model with
ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors is observationally equivalent to its counterpart
with homogeneous production factors. Table 3 shows that one needs
a very high elasticity of substitution (or a low markup) to match the
Calvo model in terms of empirical performance. It is also interesting
to note that the estimated price markup increases with the length
of the price contract, showing the substitutability between nominal
and real rigidities. Finally, the persistence parameter of the price
shock signiﬁcantly decreases with the length of the price contract.
For the four-quarter price-contract model, the estimated parame-
ter for the price markup is 0.004, which implies an extremely high
elasticity of substitution of about 250. This clearly indicates that one
needs large real rigidities in order to compensate for the reduction in
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Table 4. Estimated Models with Constrained
and/or Endogenous Demand Elasticity
(Some Selected Parameters)
φ = λp and  = 0 φ = λp and  = 0
Log Data Density −479.671 −468.344
σp 0.208 0.178
(0.015) (0.013)
ρp 0.829 0.539
(0.086) (0.056)
σa 1.099 0.650
(0.153) (0.088)
ρa 0.960 0.981
(0.011) (0.007)
λp = φ 0.006 0.489
(0.001) (0.128)

1+ 0 0.986
– (0.004)
Note: ρa and ρp are the persistence parameters associated with the pro-
ductivity and the price shock, respectively; σa and σp are the standard
error of the productivity and the price shock, respectively; γw and γp
are, respectively, the wage and price indexation parameters; φ is the
share of the ﬁxed cost; λp and λw are, respectively, the price and the
wage markup;  is the curvature parameter.
price stickiness. However, this implies that the estimated ﬁxed cost
in production (1 + φ stands at 1.515) very much exceeds the proﬁt
margin, implying negative proﬁts in steady state.
In order to circumvent this problem, one may simply impose the
zero-proﬁt condition in steady state. The estimation result obtained
for the four-quarter price-contract model is displayed in the ﬁrst
column of table 4. The empirical cost of imposing the constraint
is rather high, about 15 in log data density. Furthermore, the esti-
mated demand elasticity remains very high at about 167. Note also
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that the constraint leads to a much larger estimated standard error
of the productivity shock.
3.4 Endogenous Price Markup
Following Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004) and Coenen and Levin
(2004), we can consider a model with an endogenous markup,
whereby the optimal markup is a function of the relative price as
in Kimball (1995). Replacing the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator with the
homogeneous-degree-one aggregator considered by Kimball (1995),
the linearized optimal price equation (3b) becomes
pˆ∗t (j) =
1∑np−1
i=0 β
i
⎡⎣ 1
1 + λp · 
np−1∑
i=0
βisˆt+i(j) +
np−1∑
i=0
βipˆt+i
−
np−2∑
i=0
⎛⎝(γpπˆt+i + (1 − γp)π¯t+i+1) np−1∑
q=i+1
βq
⎞⎠⎤⎦ , (16)
where  represents the deviation from the steady-state demand elas-
ticity following a change in the relative price, while λp is the steady-
state markup:12
 =
∂
(
1+λp(z)
λp(z)
)
∂p∗
· p
∗
1+λp(z)
λp(z)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
z=1
(17)
This elasticity plays the same role as the elasticity of substitution:
the larger it is, the less the optimal price is sensitive to changes in
the marginal cost. In this sense, having  > 0 can help to reduce the
estimate for the demand elasticity to a more realistic level.
In order to illustrate this mechanism, ﬁgure 5 displays the reac-
tions of aggregate output, inﬂation, the real wage, and the interest
rate after a monetary policy shock for a model with an endoge-
nous price markup. As benchmark, we use the four-quarter price-
contract model with constant price markup estimated in table 3
12Of course, the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator corresponds to the case where  is
equal to zero.
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Figure 5. Assessing the Substitutability between
the Steady State Demand Elasticity and the
Curvature Parameter
Legend: Bold black line: estimated 4-quarter NMK model with ﬁxed
markup; black line: λp = 0.5 and  = 20; gray line: λp = 0.5 and  = 60.
and we compare it with the model integrating both the zero-proﬁt
constraint and the endogenous price markup. For the latter model,
we use the parameters estimated for the benchmark, except for the
steady-state markup, λp, which is ﬁxed at 0.5, while diﬀerent values
are used for the curvature parameter : 20 and 60. It is clear from
ﬁgure 5 that an endogenous price markup that is very sensitive to
the relative price can produce the same eﬀect on aggregate variables
as a very small constant price markup.
The next step is to reestimate the NMK model with four-quarter
price and wage Taylor contracts but adding the modiﬁcations dis-
cussed above, i.e., imposing the price markup to equate the share
of the ﬁxed cost (φ = λp) and allowing  to be diﬀerent from zero.
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The results are displayed in column 2 of table 4. When the share
of the ﬁxed cost is forced to equate the markup, shifting from a
ﬁnal good production function with a constant price markup to one
with a price markup declining in the relative price, the estimated
steady-state price markup becomes much larger, implying a demand
elasticity of about 3. This helps to reduce the cost of the constraint,
and the log data density is improved by 11. The very high estimated
curvature parameter  (about 70) reveals the need for real rigidities.
3.5 Comparing Models
Based on the log data density of the estimated models, we are not
able to discriminate between the model with homogeneous capital
and very long price contracts and the model with ﬁrm-speciﬁc cap-
ital, endogenous markup, and short price contracts. We are then
somewhat in the same position as Altig et al. (2005), who have
to compare two models that are observationally equivalent from a
macroeconomic point of view. These authors reject the model with
homogeneous capital for two reasons. First, it implies a price stick-
iness not in line with microevidence, and second, it generates too-
high volatility in cohort-speciﬁc output shares. In this section we
compare the various models in terms of their implied behavior of
cohort-speciﬁc output shares and relative prices. The latter allows
us to confront the models also with the microevidence on ﬁrms’ price
setting, which ﬁnds that price changes are typically large.
Figure 6 compares the evolution of the output share (as a per-
centage deviation from the steady state) of the ﬁrst four cohorts
of ﬁrms during the ﬁrst four periods following a monetary policy
shock and the corresponding relative price changes. We run this
comparison for four models: (i) the four-quarter Taylor contracting
model with nonmobile capital and a high elasticity of substitution
(table 3, column 2); (ii) its variant with constrained elasticity of
substitution and endogenous markup (table 4, column 2); (iii) the
nineteen-quarter Taylor contracting model with mobile capital and
an elasticity of substitution equal to 250; and (iv) the same model
with a substitution elasticity of 3.
First, focusing on the evolution of the relative prices in these
models, we observe that relative prices vary much more across
cohorts in the homogeneous factor model than in the model with
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Figure 6. Output Shares and Relative Prices for the
First Four Periods after a Monetary Policy Shock in
Homogeneous and Firm-Speciﬁc Capital Models
Legend: Columns from left to right are for cohort 1 to cohort 4. Column 5
is for the ﬁfteen cohorts that have not yet had the opportunity to reopti-
mize their price.
*See footnote 18.
ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital.13 There are two reasons for such a higher
volatility: (i) the fact that the marginal cost is independent of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc output and (ii) the length of the price contract, which
implies that only a small fraction of ﬁrms can actually change their
price. The corollary of this high relative price variability is a much
larger variability in the market shares of ﬁrms in the model with
13Note that the relative prices are displayed only for the model with ﬁrm-
speciﬁc capital and endogenous markup and for the model with mobile capital.
Indeed, in the case of mobile capital, the relative prices are not inﬂuenced by
the subsitution elasticity. For the two models with ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital, the num-
bers for relative prices are extremely close, and showing them twice would prove
redundant.
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homogeneous capital and a high substitution elasticity. In that case,
the ﬁrst cohort to reset optimally its price nearly doubles its share
in production. Even though this result is less extreme than the one
presented in Altig et al. (2005),14 such a high variability in output
shares following a monetary policy shock is empirically implausible.
However, reducing the huge elasticity of substitution to the level
consistent with a zero-proﬁt condition, we observe that the variabil-
ity of the market share becomes quite small in both models, which
weakens the argument made by Altig et al. (2005) in favor of the
model with ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital. Furthermore, it is also clear from
ﬁgure 6 that the model with ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital fails to reproduce
the large price changes observed at the microlevel.
To conclude this section, the introduction of ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital
helps to reconcile the macro models with the microevidence concern-
ing the frequency of the price changes. However, the mechanism for
this achievement is entirely based on a very strong reaction of the
marginal cost to output changes, which implies very small relative
price variations. Such small relative price changes are incompatible
with the microevidence, which typically ﬁnds that the average size
of price changes is quite large.
4. Conclusions
In this paper we have introduced ﬁrm-speciﬁc production factors in
a model with price and wage Taylor contracts. For this type of exer-
cise, Taylor contracts present a twofold advantage over Calvo-type
contracts: (i) ﬁrm-speciﬁc production factors can be introduced and
handled explicitly and (ii) the individual ﬁrm variables can be ana-
lyzed explicitly. This allows a comparison of the implications of
the various assumptions concerning the ﬁrm-speciﬁcity of produc-
tion factors not only for aggregate variables but also for cross-ﬁrm
variability.
Our main results are threefold. First, in line with existing lit-
erature, we show that introducing ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital reduces the
estimated duration of price contracts from an implausible nineteen
14In their model, with their estimated parameters, at the fourth period after
the monetary policy shock, 57 percent of the ﬁrms produce 180 percent of the
global output, leaving the remaining ﬁrms with a negative output.
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quarters to an empirically more plausible four quarters. Firm-speciﬁc
production factors make the marginal costs of individual ﬁrms steep
and very reactive to output changes. Since individual ﬁrms’ output
depends on their relative prices, ﬁrms will hesitate to make large
price adjustments. Second, introducing ﬁrm-speciﬁc labor markets
does not help in improving the empirical performance of the model.
The main reason is that observed wages are sticky, and therefore
large variations in ﬁrm-speciﬁc wages, which help in generating steep
marginal costs, are empirically implausible. Overall, it thus appears
that rigidities in the reallocation of capital across ﬁrms rather than
rigidities in the labor market are a more plausible real friction for
reducing the estimated degree of nominal price stickiness. Third, in
order to obtain this outcome, one needs a very high demand elastic-
ity, implying implausibly large variations in the demand faced by the
ﬁrms throughout the length of the contract. Imposing the zero-proﬁt
condition drastically reduces the estimated demand elasticity and
leads to a corresponding reduction in the volatility of output across
ﬁrms. However, in this case, the need for important real rigidities
becomes evident through a high estimated curvature of the demand
curve.
To compare the respective merits of the models with mobile pro-
duction factors (ﬂat marginal cost) and ﬁrm-speciﬁc production fac-
tors (increasing marginal cost), it is important to remember the
main ﬁndings emerging from microdata on ﬁrms’ pricing behavior:
price changes are at the same time frequent and large (cf. Bils and
Klenow 2004; Angeloni et al. 2006). The model with ﬂat marginal
costs does lead to large price changes but requires a high degree of
nominal stickiness to reproduce inﬂation persistence. The introduc-
tion of ﬁrm-speciﬁc marginal cost does lead to less nominal sticki-
ness but implies small relative price variations across ﬁrms. It thus
seems that, so far, neither model can simultaneously satisfy both
stylized facts. Altig et al. (2005) favor the model with ﬁrm-speciﬁc
marginal cost on the basis of the argument that it produces less-
extreme variations in output shares after an exogenous shock. We
have, however, shown that this outcome relies heavily on the price-
contract length and on the very large demand elasticity. Introducing
additional curvature in the demand function as in Kimball (1995)
signiﬁcantly reduces the variability of output shares in the model
with ﬂat marginal costs. Overall, we therefore conclude that other
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elements such as the presence of ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks will have to be
introduced to match all the important microstylized facts. Further
research on the relationship between prices, output, and marginal
costs at the ﬁrm level would be very useful in this respect.
Finally, note that in this paper and in contrast to Coenen and
Levin (2004), we did not allow for heterogeneity in the contract
length. Such heterogeneity is another important stylized fact of the
microdata. Moreover, such heterogeneity could help explain the ten-
sion between the ﬁnding of macropersistence and microﬂexibility to
the extent that the presence of sectors with long price durations
can have a disproportionately large eﬀect on the aggregate inﬂation
behavior (Dixon and Kara 2005). Further research along these lines
would be worthwhile.
Appendix 1. Data Appendix
All data are taken from the Area Wide Model (AWM) database from
the European Central Bank (see Fagan, Henry, and Mestre 2005).
Investment includes both private and public investment expendi-
tures. The sample contains data from 1970:Q2 to 2002:Q2, and the
ﬁrst ﬁfteen quarters are used to initialize the Kalman ﬁlter. Real
variables are deﬂated with their own deﬂator. Inﬂation is calculated
as the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the log GDP deﬂator. In the absence of data
on hours worked, we use total employment data for the euro area.
As explained in Smets and Wouters (2003), we therefore use for the
euro-area model an auxiliary observation equation linking labor ser-
vices in the model and observed employment based on a Calvo mech-
anism for the hiring decision of ﬁrms. The series are updated for the
most recent period using growth rates for the corresponding series
published in the ECB’s Monthly Bulletin. Consumption, investment,
GDP, wages, and hours/employment are expressed in 100 times the
log. The interest rate and inﬂation rate are expressed on a quar-
terly basis corresponding with their appearance in the model (in the
graphs the series are translated on an annual basis).
Appendix 2. Model Appendix
This appendix describes the other linearized equations of the Smets-
Wouters model (2003, 2004).
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Indexation of nominal wages results in the following real wage
equation:
wˆt =
β
1 + β
Etwˆt+1 +
1
1 + β
wˆt−1 +
β
1 + β
(Etπˆt+1 − π¯t)
− 1 + βγw
1 + β
(πˆt − π¯t) + γw1 + β (πˆt−1 − π¯t)
− 1
1 + β
(1 − βξw)(1 − ξw)(
1 + (1+λw)σlλw
)
ξw
×
[
wˆt − σl lˆt − 11 − h(cˆt − hcˆt−1) + ε
l
t
]
+ ηwt . (18)
The real wage wˆt is a function of expected and past real wages
and the expected, current, and past inﬂation rate where the relative
weight depends on the degree of indexation γw to lagged inﬂation of
the nonoptimized wages. When γw = 0, real wages do not depend on
the lagged inﬂation rate. There is a negative eﬀect of the deviation
of the actual real wage from the wage that would prevail in a ﬂexible
labor market. The size of this eﬀect will be greater, the smaller the
degree of wage stickiness (ξw), the lower the demand elasticity for
labor (higher markup λw), and the lower the inverse elasticity of
labor supply (σl) or the ﬂatter the labor supply curve. εlt is a prefer-
ence shock representing a shock to the labor supply and is assumed
to follow a ﬁrst-order autoregressive process with an i.i.d.-normal
error term: εlt = ρlε
l
t−1 + η
l
t. In contrast, η
w
t is assumed to be an
i.i.d.-normal wage-markup shock.
The dynamics of aggregate consumption are given by
cˆt =
h
1 + h
cˆt−1 +
1
1 + h
Etcˆt+1 +
σc − 1
σc(1 + λw)(1 + h)
(lˆt − Et lˆt+1)
− 1 − h
(1 + h)σc
(Rˆt − Etπˆt+1 + εbt). (19)
Consumption cˆt depends on the ex ante real interest rate (Rˆt −
Etπˆt+1) and, with external habit formation, on a weighted average
of past and expected future consumption. When h = 0, only the tra-
ditional forward-looking term is maintained. In addition, due to the
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nonseparability of the utility function, consumption will also depend
on expected employment growth (Et lˆt+1− lˆt). When the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution (for constant labor) is smaller than one
(σc > 1 ), consumption and labor supply are complements. Finally,
εbt , represents a preference shock aﬀecting the discount rate that
determines the intertemporal substitution decisions of households.
This shock is assumed to follow a ﬁrst-order autoregressive process
with an i.i.d.-normal error term: εbt = ρbε
b
t−1 + η
b
t .
The investment equation is given by
Iˆt =
1
1 + β
Iˆt−1 +
β
1 + β
EtIˆt+1 +
1/ϕ
1 + β
Qˆt + εIt , (20)
where ϕ = S¯′′ depends on the adjustment-cost function (S) and β
is the discount factor applied by the households. As discussed in
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), modeling the capital
adjustment costs as a function of the change in investment rather
than its level introduces additional dynamics in the investment
equation, which is useful in capturing the hump-shaped response
of investment to various shocks, including monetary policy shocks.
A positive shock to the investment-speciﬁc technology, εIt , increases
investment in the same way as an increase in the value of the exist-
ing capital stock Qˆt. This investment shock is also assumed to follow
a ﬁrst-order autoregressive process with an i.i.d.-normal error term:
εIt = ρIε
I
t−1 + η
I
t .
The corresponding Q equation is given by
Qˆt = −(Rˆt − πˆt+1) + 1 − τ1 − τ + r¯kEtQˆt+1 +
r¯k
1 − τ + r¯kEtrˆ
k
t+1 + η
Q
t ,
(21)
where τ stands for the depreciation rate and r¯k for the rental rate
of capital so that β = 1/(1 − τ + r¯k). The current value of the
capital stock depends negatively on the ex ante real interest rate
and positively on its expected future value and the expected rental
rate. The introduction of a shock to the required rate of return on
equity investment, ηQt , is meant as a shortcut to capture changes
in the cost of capital that may be due to stochastic variations in
the external ﬁnance premium. We assume that this equity premium
shock follows an i.i.d.-normal process. In a fully ﬂedged model, the
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production of capital goods and the associated investment process
could be modeled in a separate sector. In such a case, imperfect
information between the capital-producing borrowers and the ﬁnan-
cial intermediaries could give rise to a stochastic external ﬁnance
premium. Here, we implicitly assume that the deviation between
the two returns can be captured by a stochastic shock, whereas the
steady-state distortion due to such informational frictions is zero.
The capital accumulation equation becomes a function not only
of the ﬂow of investment but also of the relative eﬃciency of these
investment expenditures as captured by the investment-speciﬁc tech-
nology shock:
Kˆt = (1 − τ)Kˆt−1 + τ Iˆt−1 + τεIt−1. (22)
The equalization of marginal cost implies that, for a given installed
capital stock, labor demand depends negatively on the real wage
(with a unit elasticity) and positively on the rental rate of capital:
lˆt = −wˆt + (1 + ψ)rˆkt + Kˆt−1, (23)
where ψ= ψ
′(1)
ψ′′(1) is the inverse of the elasticity of the capital-
utilization cost function.
The goods market equilibrium condition can be written as
Yˆt = (1 − τky − gy)cˆt + τky Iˆt + gyεgt ++ky
1 − β(1 − τ)
β
ψrˆkt
(24a)
= φ
[
α(Kˆt−1 + ψrˆkt ) + (1 − α)(lˆt + γt
]− (φ − 1)γt, (24b)
where ky is the steady-state capital-output ratio, gy is the steady-
state government-spending-output ratio, and φ is one plus the share
of the ﬁxed cost in production. We assume that the government-
spending shock follows a ﬁrst-order autoregressive process with an
i.i.d.-normal error term: εgt = ρgε
g
t−1 + η
g
t .
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Finally, the model is closed by adding the following empirical
monetary policy reaction function:
Rˆt = π¯t + ρ(Rˆt−1 − π¯t−1)
+ (1 − ρ)[rπ(πˆt−1 − π¯t−1) + rY (Yˆt−1 − Yˆ pt−1)] (25)
+ r∆π
[
(πˆt − π¯t) − (πˆt−1 − π¯t−1)
]
+ r∆Y
[
(Yˆt − Yˆ pt ) − (Yˆt−1 − Yˆ pt−1)
]
+ ηRt . (26)
The monetary authorities follow a generalized Taylor rule by grad-
ually responding to deviations of lagged inﬂation from an inﬂa-
tion objective and the lagged output gap deﬁned as the diﬀerence
between actual and potential output. Consistently with the DSGE
model, potential output is deﬁned as the level of output that would
prevail under ﬂexible price and wages in the absence of the three
“cost-push” shocks. The parameter ρ captures the degree of inter-
est rate smoothing. In addition, there is also a short-run feedback
from the current changes in inﬂation and the output gap. Finally,
we assume that there are two monetary policy shocks: one is a tem-
porary i.i.d.-normal interest rate shock (ηRt ) also denoted a mone-
tary policy shock; the other is a permanent shock to the inﬂation
objective (π¯t), which is assumed to follow a nonstationary process
(π¯t = π¯t−1+ηπt ). The dynamic speciﬁcation of the reaction function
is such that changes in the inﬂation objective are immediately and
without cost reﬂected in actual inﬂation and the interest rate if there
is no exogenous persistence in the inﬂation process.
Appendix 3. Description of the Priors
Some parameters are ﬁxed. They are principally parameters related
to the steady-state values of the state variables. The discount factor
β is calibrated at 0.99, corresponding with an annual steady-state
real interest rate of 4 percent. The depreciation rate τ is set at
0.025, so that the annual capital depreciation is equal to 10 percent.
The steady-state share of capital income is ﬁxed at α = 0.24. The
share of steady-state consumption in total output is assumed equal
to 0.65, and the share of steady-state investment is assumed equal
to 0.17.
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The priors on the other parameters are displayed in tables 5–8
in the next appendix. The ﬁrst column is the description of the
parameter, the second column shows the prior distribution, and the
next two columns give, respectively, the prior mean and standard
error. Most of the priors are the same as in Smets and Wouters
(2003). However, there is an important diﬀerence to note regard-
ing the capital-utilization adjustment-cost parameter (ψ). Instead
of estimating 1ψ with a prior [normal 0.2 0.075], we now estimate
cz = ψ1+ψ with a prior [beta 0.5 0.25], which actually corresponds
to a much looser prior since it allows for values of the elasticity
of the capital utilization cost function between 0.1 and 10. Some
new parameters appear: the price and wage markups, which are
given a rather loose prior of [beta 0.25 0.15], and the curvature
parameter, which is estimated via eps = 1+  with a prior of [beta
0.85 0.1]. The latter allows for values of parameter  between 1.5
and 100.
For the rest, as in Smets and Wouters (2003), the persistence
parameters are given a normal prior distribution with a mean of
0.85 and a standard error of 0.10. The variance of the shocks is
assumed to follow an inverted gamma distribution with two degrees
of freedom.
Appendix 4. Parameter Estimates for the Main Models
The Metropolis-Hastings algorithm has been run with 250,000
draws. Convergence is assessed with the help of cumsum graphs and
using the Brooks and Gelman (1998) uni- and multivariate tests
performed by the Dynare software.
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